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Abstract 
Ad hoc networks are dynamic peer-to-peer wireless networks 
composed of a collection of nodes which employ wireless 
transmission methods in a self-organized way without relying 
on fixed infrastructure or predetermined connectivity. Such 
networks pose great challenges in group communication. In 
this paper, we propose an efficient group key agreement and 
recovery mechanism based on key escrow systems for ad hoc 
networks. Nodes randomly change their operation and 
perform authentication services for specific groups. 
 
Keywords: key escrow, Clipper, key agreement, key 
recovery. 
1 Introduction 
Ad hoc networks are characterized by the lack of any 
centralized entity, as any centralized entity is very easy to be 
attacked. Furthermore, an ad hoc network is extremely 
dynamic as its nodes are able to join or leave the network at 
any time [1, 5]. Moreover, the deployment of security 
mechanism in an ad hoc network is a challenging issue 
because of its above inherent characteristics. First of all, 
conventional authentication techniques can not be used in ad 
hoc networks since public key infrastructures with a 
centralized, trusted entity is not possible to be implemented. 
Thus, only distributed solutions are employed. In addition, 
group key agreement protocols are applied in ad hock 
networks instead of key agreement protocols due to lack of 
trust in the network. However, ad hoc networks are subject to 
a lot of passive and active attacks which can be derived from 
outside malicious nodes or from inside compromised hosts 
[2]. Frequently, as a result from the attacks in an ad hoc 
network is the loss or the destruction of the secret key. Thus, 
it is very useful for the ad hoc networks the existence of key 
recovery mechanisms so as the key, which encrypts the data 
transferred among nodes, to be obtained at any time it is 
necessary. A key recovery mechanism can be achieved with a 
key escrow system. A key escrow system requires a lot of 
complex computations and storage of information. These 
requirements of a key escrow system can be satisfied by smart 
cards.  
 
In this paper, we proposed an efficient group key agreement 
and recovery mechanism for ad hoc networks. Each node of 
the ad hoc network is equipped with a smart card which 
performs the complex computations required according the 
group session key agreement protocol, as well as the key 
recovery mechanism. Following the introduction, in section 2, 
we present the related work of group session key agreement 
protocols, key recovery, key escrow systems as well as the 
Clipper key escrow system. In section 3, the design of the 
proposed group session key agreement protocol is discussed. 
Furthermore, in section 4, the modified Clipper key escrow 
system is described. In section 5, the experimental results are 
presented. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Related Work 
Group Session Key Agreement Protocols 
Group key agreement protocols are generalized key 
agreement protocols which establish a common group session 
key among a group of parties and not only between two 
parties. Also, group key agreement protocols take into 
consideration the cases that parties may join or leave a group 
at any time. In these dynamic cases, supplementary group key 
agreement protocols are used in order that a new group 
session key to be derived. Moreover, group key agreement 
protocols do not require central authority. Thus, group key 
agreement protocols are suitable for ad hoc networks 
characterized by their dynamic changing topology, the lack of 
centralized control and trusted third parties as well as the 
resetting of connections [4]. Several group key agreement 
protocols are presented in [5].       
Key Recovery 
The objective of a key recovery system is to permit access to 
encrypted communication data, when the encryption key is 
lost or destroyed due to equipment failure or malicious 
activities. An establishment of a session key is always 
required in order to achieve a key recovery. A key recovery 
system derives the encryption key from information stored in 
a secure back up copy. Key escrow is a way to achieve key 
recovery. According to this mechanism, information 
associated with the decryption key is divided into several 
parts and these parts are distributed and stored to trusted third 
parties (escrow agents). Thus, the escrow agents are able to 
reconstruct the decryption key from their stored parts at any 
time [4]. 
Key escrow systems – The Clipper key escrow system 
A key escrow system provides encryption of user data using a 
session key (Ks) which can be recovered by an authorized 
third party under special circumstances. Thus, a third party, 
which has monitored the encrypted user data with the session 
key, is able to decrypt them. A very famous implementation 
of a key escrow system was the Clipper key escrow system, 
which uses the Clipper chip. This chip was developed and 
started to be promoted by the U.S. government as an 
embedded encryption device for voice communication 
systems in 1993. Clipper key escrow system offers encryption 
of the user’s data as well as capability of session key recovery 
(Ks). This system is based on the fact that two key 
components, which can create an encryption key, can be 
stored into two escrow agents (authorized third parties) which 
are going to be part of the user data recovery mechanism 
when a recovery request exists [4].  
3 Proposed Group Key Agreement Protocol 
First of all, we consider a group of N nodes. We suppose that 
this group is a cluster created by applying any clustering 
algorithm in an ad hoc network [3]. We consider that the 
cluster-head (one of the N nodes) which is elected according 
the applied clustering algorithm is our Checker. Furthermore, 
we consider that the Checker and each node of this cluster are 
connected with a smart card. Firstly, we employ our group 
session key agreement protocol on the created cluster. Then, 
our modified Clipper key escrow system can be employed for 
key recovering at any time in our group (cluster). The 
Checker is considered as the only key escrow agent in our 
system. Furthermore we consider that each node has a unique 
identity number, ID. Also, each node knows the secret master 
key ( MK ), which is the stored key in the smart card, and the 
ID of the Checker. In addition, each node has embedded a 
unique key ( UK ).  
 
In the first step, each node sends to the Checker a message 
that includes its ID (id_node), the ID of the Checker 
(id_checker), and an encrypted message with the master 
key MK , which is derived from the concatenation of the ID of 
the node (id_node), the ID of the Checker (id_checker) and a 
nonce (nonce_node) generated randomly by each node 
(i.e. )_||ker_||_( nodenoncechecidnodeidE
MK  ).    
 
In the second step, the Checker decrypts the received 
encrypted message from each node and obtains the ID of each 
node. Then, the Checker compares it with the ID of each node 
sent outside of the encrypted message in order to authenticate 
each node. After that, the Checker sends to each node a 
message that includes its ID (id_checker), the ID of the 
corresponding node (id_node), and an encrypted message 
with the master key MK , which is derived from the 
concatenation of the ID of the Checker (id_checker), the ID 
of the corresponding node (id_node), the nonce generated by 
the corresponding node in the step one increased by one 
(nonce_node+1) and a nonce (nonce_checker) generated by  
Checker,  (i.e. ker_||1_||_||ker_( checnoncenodenoncenodeidchecidE
MK + ).    
 
In the third step, each node decrypts the received encrypted 
message from the Checker and obtains the ID of the Checker. 
Then, each node compares it with the ID of the Checker sent 
outside of the encrypted message in order to authenticate the 
Checker. After that, each node sends to the Checker a 
message that includes its ID (id_node), the ID of the Checker 
(id_checker), and an encrypted message with the master 
key MK , which is derived from the concatenation of the ID 
of the node (id_node), the ID of the Checker (id_checker), the 
nonce (nonce_checker) generated by the Checker increased 
by one (nonce_checker+1) and the unique key of each node 
(i.e. )||1ker_||ker_||_( _nodeUK KchecnoncechecidnodeidE M +  ).  
 
In the forth step, the Checker decrypts all the received 
encrypted messages and obtains the unique keys of all nodes. 
Thus, the Checker is able to create the family key ( FK ). The 
family key is calculated in the Checker by the following 
formula:  
121 _____ ... −⊕⊕⊕= NnodeUnodeUnodeUF KKKK  
We note that the family key ( FK ) is a key which contains 
key contributions of each node apart from the Checker.  
Then, the Checker broadcasts the family key ( FK ) to all 
nodes. In particular, the Checker broadcasts a message which 
includes its ID (id_checker), and an encrypted message with 
the master key ( MK ), which is derived from the 
concatenation of the ID of the Checker (id_checker), the 
family key ( FK ), a random quantity (S_checker) generated 
by the Checker and another random quantity (nonce1) 
generated by the Checker 
(i.e. )1||ker_||||ker_( noncechecSKchecidE FKM ). 
 
In the fifth step, each node decrypts the received encrypted 
message from the Checker, obtains the random quantity 
(S_checker) generated by the Checker, the random quantity 
(nonce1) generated by the Checker and the family key ( FK ) 
which was created by the Checker in the previous step. After 
that, each node constructs a session key ( iK ) with the 
following XOR function: 
ker_ checSKK Fi ⊕=  
Then, each node sends to the Checker a message that includes 
its ID (id_node), the ID of the Checker (id_checker), and the 
hash value produced by the hash function H of a message 
derived from the concatenation of the ID of the Checker 
(id_checker), the random quantity (nonce1) generated by the 
Checker in the forth step increased by one (nonce1+1) and the 
calculated session key ( iK ) 
(i.e. )||11||ker_( iKnoncechecidH + ). 
 
In the sixth step, the Checker compares the hash values that it 
received from each node. If the Checker finds that all the 
received hash values are the same 
( 121 ... −==== Ns KKKK ), it means that each node has 
generated the same session key ( K ). Then, the Checker 
notifies all nodes that the session key has been established 
successfully. Thus, the Checker sends to each node a message 
that includes its ID (id_checker), and an encrypted message 
with the master key ( MK ), which is derived from the 
concatenation of the ID of the Checker (id_checker) and an 
number (ack_code) which is known to the nodes a priori and 
means that the session key has been established successfully 
(i.e. )_||ker_( codeackchecidE
MK ).  
Thus, the group session key agreement protocol flow is the 
following: 
 
 
Fig. 1. The proposed group session key agreement protocol 
flow 
4 Modified Clipper Key Escrow System 
When the group session key agreement protocol is 
accomplished, each node has obtained the two critical keys 
which are going to be used for the creation of its modified 
LEAFs. These two critical keys are the family key ( FK ) and 
the session key ( iK ) of each node which is the group session 
key ( is KK = ) as all nodes have created the same session key 
according to the sixth step of group session key agreement 
protocol. Our modified key escrow system consists of the 
following processes: 
 
Process 1  
First of all, the modified LEAF is created. The modified 
LEAF is a data block which contains the ID of the node, the 
encrypted session key with the unique key of each node 
( )(E
U_nodeK sK ), a hash value (hash_value) and a timestamp. 
The hash value (hash_value) is created by the hash function H 
of a message derived from the concatenation of the session 
key ( SK ) and a random value. 
Then, the LEAF block is encrypted with the family key ( FK ) 
(i.e. )||_||)(||_(
_
timestampvaluehashKEnodeidE SKK nodeUF ). After 
that, the node sends its ID and the LEAF block to the 
Checker. The Checker stores the received LEAF in a file 
according to the ID of the node that sent it. Thus, the Checker 
stores the LEAFs of each node. 
 
Process 2  
In case that a node wants to recover the session key, it needs 
to send a recovery request message to the Checker. Thus, the 
node sends to the Checker a recovery request message that 
includes its ID (id_node), and an encrypted message with the 
master key MK , which is derived from the concatenation of 
the ID of the node (id_node) and the recovery code 
(rec_code) (i.e. )_||_( coderecnodeidE
MK ).   
 
Process 3  
When the Checker receives the recovery request message, it 
decrypts the received encrypted message and obtains the ID 
of the node and the recovery code. Then, the Checker 
compares the obtained ID with the ID of the node sent outside 
of the encrypted message in order to authenticate the node. 
After that, the Checker recognizes the recovery code and 
restores the LEAF that corresponds to the node that sent the 
recovery request message. Then, the Checker decrypts the 
restored LEAF with the family key ( FK ), which is common 
for the Checker and all nodes according to the group session 
key protocol, and obtains the encrypted session key with the 
unique key of the node ( )(E
U_nodeK sK ). Then, the Checker 
sends to the node a message that includes its ID (id_checker) 
and an encrypted message with the master key MK , which is 
derived from the concatenation of the ID of the Checker 
(id_checker) and the encrypted session key with the unique 
key of the node ( )(E
U_nodeK sK ) 
(i.e. ))(E||ker_(
U_nodeK sK KchecidE M ).   
 
Process 4  
The node that sent the recovery request message, receives the 
response message of the Checker, decrypts the received 
encrypted message and obtains the ID of the Checker as well 
as the encrypted session key with its unique key 
( )(E
U_nodeK sK ).Then, the node compares the obtained ID 
with the ID of the Checker sent outside of the encrypted 
message in order to authenticate the Checker. After that, the 
node decrypts the quantity ( )(E
U_nodeK sK ) with its unique key 
in order to obtain the session key ( SK ). 
 
5 Experimental Results 
For the implementation, we considered that our group 
consists of three nodes and each node is connected with a 
smart card. One of them is the Checker. Thus, the simulation 
environment consists of the Checker, the Node1 and the 
Node2. For the communication between the Checker and 
Node1 and for the communication between the Checker and 
Node2 we used the client/server model. Furthermore, all 
required cryptographic functions (encryption, decryption, 
hashing), were executed by the Cryptoflex Smart Card. There 
are three types of encryption: encryption with the master key, 
encryption with the family key and encryption with the 
unique key of each node.     
 
The master key is a DES key stored in the smart card. In case 
that one of the three applications needs to make encryption 
with the master key, then the application gets connection with 
the smart card, sends the data for encryption to it and the 
smart card encrypts these data with the stored DES key. Then, 
the smart card returns the encrypted data back to the 
application.   
 
The family key is created during the group key agreement 
protocol. Now, the encryption with the family key includes 
two steps. In the first step, the application, which wants to 
make encryption with the family key, gets connection with 
the smart card, sends the data for encryption to it and the 
smart card encrypts these data with the stored DES key. Then, 
the smart card returns the encrypted data back to the 
application. In the second step, the application is XORing the 
returned encrypted data with the family key.  
 
Each node has embedded a unique key. The encryption with 
the unique key of a node includes two steps too. In the first 
step, the application, which wants to make encryption with 
the unique key, gets connection with the smart card, sends the 
data for encryption to it and the smart card encrypts these data 
with the stored DES key. Then, the smart card returns the 
encrypted data back to the application. In the second step, the 
application is XORing the returned encrypted data with the 
unique key. 
 
Furthermore, for each of the above encryption type there is 
the corresponding decryption type: decryption with the master 
key, decryption with the family key and decryption with the 
unique key of each node. Thus, in case that one of the three 
applications needs to decrypt encrypted data with the master 
key, then the application gets connection with the smart card, 
sends the encrypted data for decryption to it and the smart 
card decrypts these data with the stored DES key. Then, the 
smart card returns the decrypted data back to the application. 
 
In case that one application needs to decrypt encrypted data 
with the family key, then two steps are required. In the first 
step, the application is XORing the encrypted data with the 
family key. In the second step, the application gets connection 
with the smart card, sends the data which is the result of XOR 
for decryption to the smart card and the smart card decrypts 
these data with the stored DES key. Then, the smart card 
returns the decrypted data back to the application. 
 
In case that one application needs to decrypt encrypted data 
with the unique key of a node, then two steps are required. In 
the first step, the application is XORing the encrypted data 
with the unique key. In the second step, the application gets 
connection with the smart card, sends the data which is the 
result of XOR for decryption to the smart card and the smart 
card decrypts these data with the stored DES key. Then, the 
smart card returns the decrypted data back to the application. 
 
Regarding hashing, in case that one application needs to 
calculate the hash value of an amount of data, then the 
application gets connection with the smart card, sends the 
data to it and the smart card calculates the corresponding hash 
value. 
 
We measured that the proposed group session key agreement 
protocol requires 21 seconds until to be accomplished. In 
other words, Node1 should wait 21 sec until to receive the 
ack_code in step 6. Furthermore, we calculated that Node1 
should wait 4 sec until to recover the session key. This is the 
required time from the moment that Node1 sends the 
rec_code in process 2 until to achieve the recovery. 
6 Conclusion 
Ad hoc networks suffer from lack of reliable security 
mechanisms due to their inherent characteristics. In this 
paper, we proposed an efficient group key agreement and 
recovery mechanism. Our mechanism performs better than 
other protocols [5] at the key agreement and recovery phase.     
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